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Security Flaws in Zhang and Xu Improved 
Concurrent Signature Scheme 
Abstract. Nguyen first introduces the unlinkability 
property for concurrent signature schemes to 
protect signers’ privacy.  Huang and Wang 
proposed a fair concurrent signature scheme based 
on identity recently.  However, Zhang and Xu 
show that Huang and Wang scheme does not 
satisfy the unforgeability property, because Huang 
and Wang scheme is vulnerable to forgery.  To 
overcome the forgery flaws, they proposed an 
improved scheme.  Unfortunately, a new cheating 
attack is proposed to show that Zhang and Xu 
scheme is still unfair.  Zhang and Xu scheme does 
not provide unlinkability property, so the privacy 
protection is weak. 
Keywords: Unlinkabiliy, fairness, concurrent 
signatures, fair exchange. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chen et al. [2] introduces concurrent 
signatures as a new solution for fair signature 
exchange problem between two signers.  The 
fairness of the concurrent signature scheme is 
based on the idea of ambiguous signatures that 
maybe generated only by two possible signers.  In 
a concurrent signature scheme, an initial signer 
sends the matching signer an ambiguous signature 
which is bound by a secret value, keystone.  After 
verifying the ambiguous signature from the initial 
signer, the matching signer sends the initial signer 
his/her ambiguous signature.  After verifying the 
matcher signer’s ambiguous signature, the initial 
signer can transform the matching signer’s 
ambiguous signature into the signature binding to 
the matching signer by releasing the keystone.  
After the release of the keystone, the matching 
signer can transform the initial signer’s ambiguous 
signature into the signature binding to the initial 
signer.  Finally, both the signers fairly exchange 
their signatures. 
Nguyen [3] stressed the importance of 
unlinkability of concurrent signature for the 
privacy protection in real applications.  By 
unlinkability, no one can find out the link between 
the two exchanged signatures in the concurrent 
signature scheme.  For example, the concurrent 
signature scheme is used in the electronic 
transaction on Internet.  The customer and the 
merchant have to fairly exchange the signature of 
the customer’s payment instruction and the 
signature of the merchant’s agreement on 
customers’ order.  However, the customer does not 
hope anyone finds out the link between the 
payment and the order agreement, due to the 
privacy protection.  Therefore, the unlinkability is 
important in the real applications. 
Huang and Wang [4] proposed a fair ID-based 
concurrent signature scheme.  Unfortunately, 
Zhang and Xu[5] show that Huang and Wang 
scheme does not satisfy the unforgeability property.  
To fix the forgery problem of Huang and Wang 
scheme, they proposed an improved scheme.  
However, a new cheating attack is proposed to 
show that Zhang and Xu scheme does not satisfy 
the fairness and the unlinkability properties. 
The security requirements of a concurrent 
signature scheme are stated in the next section.  
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Then Zhang and Xu scheme will be reviewed in 
Section III.  The new cheating attack and some 
comments on Zhang and Xu scheme are presented 
in Section IV.  Finally, Section V is a brief 
conclusion. 
 
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
A secure concurrent signature scheme should 
satisfy the following security requirements: 
Correctness: If a signature σ is generated 
correctly by Asign algorithm on a message m, 
Averify algorithm returns “accept” with a 
non-negligible probability.  Given a signature σ on 
m and a security parameter l, after the keystone k is 
released, the output of Verify algorithm is “accept” 
with a non-negligible probability 
Unforgeability: Except the cooperation of the 
initial signer and the matching signer, no one can 
generate a valid concurrent signature with a 
non-negligible probability. 
Ambiguity: Before the keystone k is released, 
no verifier is able to identify the actual signer with 
the probability that is greater than 1/2. 
Fairness: Both signatures of the initial signer 
and the matching signer can be bound with their 
signers’ identities simultaneously after the keystone 
k is released. 
Unlinkability: The relationship between two 
exchanged concurrent signatures cannot be found, 
as long as the keystone is released  
 
III. REVIEW OF ZHANG AND XU SCHEME 
The bilinear pairing and the underlying security 
assumption are stated before the review of Zhang 
and Xu scheme. 
A. Bilinear Pairings and Security Assumptions 
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by 
the element P with order q, and G2 be a cyclic 
multiplicative group with the same order q, where q 
is a prime number.  A bilinear pairing is a map e: 
G1×G1→G2 satisfying three properties: 
Bilinear property: For any elements P, Q, RG1, 
e(P+Q, R)=e(P, R)e(Q, R) and e(P, Q+R)= e(P, 
Q)e(P, R). 
Non-degenerated property: There exist P and 
QG1 such that e(P, Q)≠ 1, where 1 is the identity 
of the group G2. 
Computable property: A polynomial-time 
algorithm exists to compute e(P, Q) for two 
elements P and Q  G1. 
The security of Zhang and Xu scheme is 
based on the Computational Co-Diffie-Hellman 
(Co-CDH for short) assumption.  The Co-CDH 
problem and assumption are defined below. 
Co-CDH Problem: Given a randomly chosen (P1, 
P2, aP1, bP2), compute abP2G2, where P1 and 
P2G1, and a, b Zq
*
 are two unknown integers. 
Co-CDH Assumption: For every probabilistic 
polynomial-time algorithm A, the probability of A 
solving Co-CDH-Problem is negligible. 
 
B. Zhang and Xu Scheme 
Zhang and Xu’s scheme [1] consists of the five 
algorithms and one protocol.  The five algorithms 
are Setup, Key generation, Asign, Averify, and 
Verify algorithms.  In the following, Setup, Key 
generation, Asign, and Averify algorithms are 
describe first.  Then the protocol is stated.  
Finally the Verify algorithm is stated. 
Setup Algorithm 
The system parameters and functions are 
generated by this algorithm.  The private key 
generator (PKG for short) randomly chooses its 
master private key s∈Zq
*
, and sets its public key 
Ppub= sP.  Then PKG publishes two cryptographic 
hash functions H1:{0, 1}
*→G1 and H2:{0, 1}
*→ 
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Zq
*
.  Then the system parameters are {G1, G2, e, q, 
P, Ppub, H1, H2}.  All the message space M, 
keystone space K and keystone fix space F are Zq
*
. 
 
Key Generation Algorithm 
The signer Ui submits PKG his/her identity IDi, 
then PKG sets Ui's public key Pi= H1(IDi) and 
computes the signer's private key si= sPi. 
Asign Algorithm 
By using this algorithm, the user generates the 
ambiguous signature on some message.  Suppose 
that Signer Ui generates his/her ambiguous 
signature on the message mi for Uj.  On the given 
input (Pi , Pj , si , f, mi), Ui randomly chooses αZq
*
, 
sets C1= f, and computes h= H2(mi||Pi||Pj||C1), C2= 
αPi-C1-hPj, and V= (h+α)si.  The output 
ambiguous signature is σi 
=(C1, C2,V). 
Averify Algorithm 
To validate the ambiguous signature σi= (C1, 
C2, V) generated by Ui for Uj, the input of this 
algorithm is (mi, σi, Pi, Pj, Ppub).  On this input, 
check whether or not e(P, V)= e(Ppub, 
C1+C2+hPi+hPj).  If the equation holds, output 
“accept”; otherwise, output “reject”.  
After the description of those four algorithms, 
the protocol for the exchange of concurrent 
signatures is stated below. Without losing 
generality, suppose that UA is the initial signer and 
UB is the matching signer. 
Concurrent Signature Protocol 
Step 1: The initial signer UA chooses a random 
number αZq
*
, and computes β1= e(P, 
Ppub)

 and β2= H2(e(Ppub,PB)

).  UA also 
picks a random keystone kZq
*
, and 
computes c= mAβ2, f= H2(k||β1||c), and 
S= αPpub-fsA, where mA is the exchanging 
message of UA.  Then UA generates 
his/her ambiguous signature σA= Asign(PA, 
PB, sA, f, mA)= (C1, C2, V).   Finally send 
(σA, c, S) to B. 
Step 2: UB computes β1= e(P, S)e(Ppub, PA)
C1, β2= 
H2(e(S, PB)e(PA, sB)
C1),
 
and mA= cβ2.  
Then verify the ambiguous signature σA 
by Averify(mA, σA, PA, PB, Ppub).  If 
Averify(mA, σA, PA, PB, Ppub)= “reject”, 
abort. 
Step 3: UB chooses a random number tZq*, and 
computes β3= e(P, Ppub)
t
 and β4= 
H2(e(Ppub,PA)
t
).  On the exchanged 
message mB, UB computes c'= mBβ4, f= 
H2(C1||β3||c'), and S'= tPpub- fsB. Then 
generate the ambiguous signature σB= 
Asign(PB, PA , sB , f, mB)= (C1', C2', V'). 
Finally send (σB , c', S') to UA. 
Step 4: UA computes β3= e(P,S')e(Ppub, PB)
C1', β4= 
H2(e(S', PA
 
)e(PB, sA )
C1'
 
) and mB= c' β4.
  
Then verify the ambiguous σB by 
performing Averify(mB, σB, PB, PA, Ppub).  
If the result is “reject”, abort.  Check 
whether or not C1'=H2(C1||β3||c').  If C1' 
H2(C1||β3||c'), then A aborts; otherwise, A 
releases the keystone k to B and both 
signatures are binding concurrently. 
Finally, (mA, σA, c, S, mB, σB, c', S', k) become the 
concurrent signature of two parties. 
The concurrent signature verification 
algorithm is stated below. 
Concurrent Signature Verification 
On the concurrent signature (mA, σA, c, S, mB, 
σB, c', S', k), compute β1=e(P, S)e(Ppub , PA)
C1, and 
check whether or not C1= H2(k||β1||c) and  
Averify(mA, σA, PA, PB,Ppub)= “accept”.  Return 
invalid if neither C1= H2(k||β1||c) nor Averify(mA, 
σA, PA, PB,Ppub)= “accept” holds.  Then compute 
β3= e(P, S')e(Ppub , PB)
C1', and check whether or not 
4 
C1'= H2(C1||β3||c') and Averify(mB, σB, PA, PB, 
Ppub)= “accept”.  Return invalid if any equation 
does not hold; otherwise, return valid to means that 
(mA, σA, c, S, mB, σB, c', S', k) is a valid concurrent 
signature of A and B on mA and mB. 
 
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF ZHANG AND 
XU SCHEME 
The new cheating attack on Zhang and Xu 
scheme is first proposed.  By our cheating attack, 
the initial signer obtains the concurrent signature 
on some message without the agreement of the 
matching signers.  The matching signer cannot 
obtain the concurrent signature after the concurrent 
signature protocol. 
Cheating attack  
  Our cheating attack on Zhang and Xu scheme is 
described below. 
Step 1: Initial signer UA chooses a random 
number αZq
*
, and computes β1= e(P, 
Ppub)

 and β2= H2(e(Ppub,PB)

).  UA picks 
a random keystone kZq
*
, and computes 
c= mAβ2, f= H2(k||β1||c), and S= αPpub-fsA, 
where mA is the exchanging message of 
UA.  Then UA generates his/her 
ambiguous signature σA= Asign(PA, PB, sA, 
f, mA)= (C1, C2, V).  To cheating the 
matching signer, UA computes his/her 
cheating ambiguous signature σA"= 
Asign(PA
 
, PB, sA , f , mA")= (C1, C2", V"), 
where mA"
 
is a cheating message.  
Choose a random S" and compute β2"= 
H2(e(S", PB)e(sA, PB)
C1) and c"= mA"β2".  
Finally send (σA", c", S") to UB. 
Step 2: UB computes β1"= e(P, S")e(Ppub, PA)
C1, 
β2"= H2(e(S", PB)e(PA, sB)
C1)
 
and mA"= 
c"β2".  Then verify the ambiguous 
signature σA" by Averify(mA", σA", PA, PB, 
Ppub).  If Averify(mA", σA", PA, PB, Ppub)= 
“reject”, abort. 
Step 3: UB chooses a random number tZq*, and 
computes β3= e(P, Ppub)
t
 and β4= H2(e(Ppub, 
PA)
t
).  On the exchanged message mB, UB 
computes c'= mBβ4, f= H2(C1||β3||c'), and 
S'=tPpub-fsB.  Then generate the 
ambiguous signature σB= Asign(PB, PA , 
sB , f, mB)= (C1', C2', V').  Finally send 
(σB , c', S') to UA. 
Step 4: UA computes β3= e(P,S')e(Ppub, PB)
C1', 
β4=H2(e(S', PA
 
)e(PB, sA)
C1') and mB=c'β4.
  
Then verify the ambiguous σB by 
performing Averify(mB, σB, PB, PA, Ppub) If 
the result is “reject”, abort.  Check 
whether or not C1'=H2(C1||β3||c').  If C1' 
H2(C1||β3||c'), then A aborts; otherwise, A 
obtains the valid concurrent signature (σA
 
, 
c , S , σB
 
, c' , S' , k) on the message mA 
and mB without the agreement of UB by 
using the keystone k. 
On the other hand, the concurrent signature (σA", c", 
S", σB
 
, c' , S' , k) is illegal for C1 H2(k||β1"||c").  
That is the matching signer UB does not obtain the 
concurrent signature he/she wants.  Notice that 
Averify(m"A, σ"A, PA, PB, Ppub) must be accept for 
the cheating ambiguous signature σA"= Asign(PA, 
PB, sA, f, mA").  Thus the initial signer UA obtains 
the concurrent signature he/she wants.  Therefore 
our cheating attack is successful. 
Moreover, Zhang and Xu scheme does not 
satisfy unlinkability property that is an important 
security requirement in real applications of 
concurrent signatures. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A cheating attack is proposed to show that 
Huang et al. concurrent signature scheme is not fair. 
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Huang et al. scheme does not provide unlinkability 
but it is important properties for the concurrent 
signature scheme [3]. 
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